How Assad’s Fall Could Impact Iraq
By Sarhang Hamasaeed. Posted on USIP.org on December 17, 2024.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
If Syria moves toward democracy, it could renew democratic energy in Iraq.
But if sectarianism dominates in Syria, it could rekindle similar dynamics in Iraq.
Iraqi Kurds and minorities arguably have the most at stake and will be hoping for inclusive governance in Syria.
The fall of President Bashar al-Assad earlier this month and what comes next in Syria will likely have significant security, political and other implications for Iraq. The situation is dynamic and could evolve in favor of Iraq’s stability or pose new challenges for the country. Iraq is one of a key group of actors — along with Iran, Turkey, the Gulf countries and the United States — whose actions could significantly impact Syria’s trajectory in the months ahead.
The modern history of Iraq and Syria is deeply intertwined and has many troubled junctures. The Baath Party started in Syria, from which the Iraqi version emerged, and both produced diverging but nonetheless disastrous authoritarian regimes and dictatorships — the Assad family in Syria and Saddam Hussein in Iraq — that brought ruin to both countries. In the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war, Assad’s father aligned with Iran.
After 2003, Bashar al-Assad’s regime enabled the flow of suicide bombers into Iraq that led to the death of many Iraqis and American service members. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham/Syria (ISIS) controlled territories in both countries and turned them into one stage of operation. Iraqi Shia groups fought in Syria, propping up Assad during the country’s revolution. The head of the rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, that overthrew Assad, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani (now using his given name Ahmed al-Sharaa), fought in Iraq as a jihadi in the ranks of al-Qaida and spent time in the U.S. military’s Camp Bucca, a detention center in Iraq.
Staying Out of Syria
As Syrian rebel groups advanced in recent weeks, some Iraqi leaders and groups called for Iraqi state and non-state military engagement in Syria, largely to defend Shia interests and fight terrorist groups. This would have risked dragging Iraq into a war at a time when Russia and Iran, patrons with more vested interests in Assad, did not rescue him.
While Moscow and Tehran were clearly avoiding further military entanglement in Syria, Baghdad seemed poised to slip into the conflict, raising questions about Iraqi actors’ political instincts and if they might miscalculate again as the situation in Syria unfolds, especially if sectarian violence breaks out. In the end, Iraq demonstrated its own agency and avoided being entangled in Syria’s conflict. Other factors that contributed to Iraq staying out of Syria, were following good external advice and, perhaps, the rapid nature of Assad’s fall.
Iraq participated in a regional dialogue focused on developing a unified Arab stance to developments in Syria. Helping build a new Syria provides Iraq with an opportunity to continue its trajectory of being a constructive regional player rather than party to conflict.
Conflict Risks
In the context of the post-October 7 conflict, Iraqis fear their country may become the new battleground following Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. Iranian-backed Iraqi groups, who are part of the “Axis of Resistance,” have attacked Israel with drones. Israel has threatened to respond.
A stabilizing Syria that tamps down violent extremist organizations would be good for Iraq’s stability. But the risk of Syrian extremist groups exploiting governance vacuums, economic hardships, sectarian rivalry and violence could pose serious risks to Iraq, which shares a 600-kilometer border with Syria. Even before Assad’s fall, Iraq was concerned about extremist threats from ISIS and other groups. This was especially true amid recent reports of an ISIS resurgence in Syria and the fragile conditions in territories under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF manages al-Hol camp, which still houses more than 17,000 Iraqis, and prisons that hold thousands of ISIS fighters, including a couple of thousand Iraqis.
Democracy or Sectarianism?
A democratizing Syria could have a refreshing effect on Iraq’s democracy, which has been backsliding at the institutional level over the past decade. Having suffered under the brutal rule of dictator Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party, Iraqis welcomed the end of Assad’s ruthless dictatorship. For Iraqis, the images of Syrians pouring into the streets, Assad family statues brought down, prisoners freed, and families re-uniting with loved ones brought back memories of 2003, when Iraqis had similar experiences after the fall of Saddam.
An inclusive political process in Syria could inspire hope and positive energy, especially if Iraq could engage positively in Syria. Alternatively, if sectarianism dominates in Syria, especially if backed by regional Sunni countries, it may rekindle similar sentiments in Iraq. An alarmed or wary Shia community, the majority in Iraq, could further squeeze Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. Iraqi Sunnis may draw strength from their Syrian brethren — an excited Sunni interlocutor told me in 2013 that they felt success of the Syrian revolution would strengthen their cause — and push back.
Iraqis have witnessed the collision of three expanding regional forces: Iran, Israel and Turkey. The latter two seem to be advancing, while Iran has been forced to retreat. Sunnis and Shia feel they have strong regional allies, while the Kurds, Christians, Yazidis and other minorities feel they are the weakest link in a regional order where the terms are set by regional and outside powers. The Kurds have been losing territory and governing power in both Iraq and Syria, while for the other minorities, their very existence is at stake.
Iraqis are generally happy that Iran lost an ally in Assad and a land corridor in Syria, which may reduce pressure on them. But they also fear Iran may try to further tighten its grip on Iraq to prevent further retreat and compensate for what it has lost so far. The impact of the destruction that ISIS brought to Iraq, especially the Sunni areas, is still fresh — so the appetite for violence is low. As the most influential regional actor in Iraq, Iran also has a choice to make: exert more control in Iraq and set the country back as a result; loosen its grip and signal a constructive attitude to a changing regional order; or stay the current course of high influence around which a degree of political calm exists, where Iran benefits economically and politically and the Iraqis are spared violence.
U.S. Engagement
The dynamics between Iran and the new U.S. administration will affect Iraq. The U.S. and Iraq have agreed to end the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS’s military mission in Iraq by September 2025 and negotiate a bilateral security partnership consistent with the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement and Iraq’s constitution. In 2014, Iraqis wanted U.S. support against ISIS. Now they want the U.S. to prevent an Israeli attack on Iraq.
The Kurds, other ethnic groups, religious minorities and civil society organizations in Iraq and Syria will watch developments closely and hope for proactive U.S. and international engagement in both countries to help move toward inclusive governance and stability as the alternative could be bleak for them.